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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet continues to have an impact on securities law, new issues
arise that must be resolved.' Internet use especially impacts the ever-changing
area of insider trading.! Specifically, the rise of the Internet is problematic
because individuals can hack into computers, acquire nonpublic information, and
then trade on that information. To be found guilty of insider trading under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, a defendant must acquire the inside
information by deception.' While some writers have touched on this topic
briefly,4 there has been no in-depth analysis as to whether a hacker can satisfy the
deception element of insider trading by deceiving a computer.' Recently, in SEC
v. Dorozhko, the Second Circuit had the chance to decide the issue.
On October 9, 2007, IMS Health (IMS), a company that provides market
information to the healthcare and pharmaceutical companies,' announced that it
would post its earnings on the 17th of that month. Although IMS planned to
announce negative earnings that were below prior estimates, there were no media
reports predicting such a negative announcement, and some analysts even opined
that IMS was in good financial health.9 Thomson Financial, an information
company, had the responsibility of posting the earnings over the Internet.o
However, days before IMS announced that it would publicize its earnings,
Oleksandr Dorozhko transferred $42,500 to Interactive Brokers LLC and opened
an online trading account." On October 17, using a technique called "spoofing,"12
Dorozhko hacked into Thomson Financial's website, searching for the IMS

1. Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challengesfor the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 265 (1999) ("There is no doubt that the Internet is revolutionizing the securities
business. This revolution mandates a reexamination of most aspects of how the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") regulates securities.").
2. See generally id. (examining the Internet's affect on insider trading law).
3. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008).
4. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEvURTz, CORPORATION LAw 627 (2010) (raising the issue of whether
hacking into a computer satisfies the deception element).
5. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 1, at 306 (briefly opining that hacking would satisfy the deception
element).
6. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d. Cir. 2009).
7. IMS Facts at a Glance, IMSHEALTH.COM, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/ (follow
"About Us" hyperlink; then follow "Facts At-a-Glance" hyperlink) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 324-25.
12. Id. at 325 n.3 (noting that "spoofing" is a location hiding technique).
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earnings report." Once IMS transferred the earnings report to Thomson
Financial, Dorozhko found the information and downloaded it.14 Subsequently,
Dorozhko purchased $41,670.90 worth of put options in IMS.'5 After IMS
announced its below-expected earnings, its stock dropped significantly. 6
Dorozhko then sold his put options and made a profit of $286,456.59."
The Second Circuit had to decide two pivotal issues.'" First, whether a
fiduciary duty is necessary in an insider trading case involving computer
hacking." Importantly, the court found that Dorozhko could still be implicated as
20
an insider even though he owed no fiduciary duty to the information supplier.
Second, whether computer hacking constitutes deception.2 ' More specifically:
whether a computer can be deceived.22 Avoiding the second issue, the court
remanded that specific question to the district court.23
Part II of this Comment will provide a background of insider trading law,
with a focus on the deceptive device element of § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. Part III will present the SEC's arguments which support
the view that hacking amounts to deception, and will then explain why those
arguments do not adequately address the issue. Part IV will examine the
competing arguments concerning whether computers have the capacity to think.
This discussion will highlight the fact that such a philosophical determination,
while necessary for 10(b) purposes, is beyond the grasp of the courts. Since both
13. Id. at 325.
14. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d. Cir. 2009).
15. Id. An "option" is defined as "[t]he right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell a given quantity of
securities ... at a fixed price within a specified time []." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1203 (9th ed. 2009). A
"put option" is defined as "taln option to sell something ... at a fixed price even if the market declines." Id.
16. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 44 ("When the market opened [on October 18th], IMS's stock price sank
approximately 28% almost immediately .... ).
17. Id. Traders purchase put options to take advantage of a drop in price of the stock. Id. at 44 n. 1.
18. See id. at 50-51 (introducing both issues presented by the case).
19. Id. at 43-44 ("We are asked to consider whether. . .computer hacking may be 'deceptive' where the
hacker did not breach a fiduciary duty . . . .").
20. Id. at 45 (finding that Dorozhko was an inside trader even though the SEC acknowledged that
Dorozhko had not breached any fiduciary duty).
21. Id. at 45-46.
22. See id. at 50-51 (questioning whether computer hacking can be deceptive).
23. Id. at 51 ("[W]e are hesitant to move from this general principle to a particular application without
the benefit of the district court's views as to whether the computer hacking in this case-as opposed to
computer hacking in general-was 'deceptive."'). On remand, the district court granted the Commission's
motion for summary judgment. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Summary Judgment Against Computer
Hacker for Insider Trading (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/
2010/lr21465.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The motion was unopposed, however, seemingly
because the defendant was unwilling to communicate with his attorney. Yin Wilczek, Insider Trading:
Enforcers Turn Corneron Insider Trading by Hedge Funds, Say Current,Ex-SEC Staff, 42 SRLR 519 (Mar. 22,
2010) ("The defendant 'has failed to respond to numerous requests from counsel for directions as to how to
proceed in connection with the instant litigation,' [the defendant's attorney] said. Accordingly, counsel is
without any factual basis to respond to the instant summary judgment motion and therefore does not oppose
it.").
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computers and humans have the ability to process information, computers
arguably have the capacity to think for insider trading purposes. Thus, courts
have grounds for giving computers legal consciousness. Part V concisely
explains the reasoning that courts can rely on. Part VI sets forth an alternative
approach whereby courts can give computers personhood, finding that computers
can be deceived for the purposes of insider trading.
This Comment ultimately argues that, while the debate about artificial
intelligence continues without end in sight, it would be wise for courts to give
computers a legal ability to think in the Section 10(b) context as it relates to
hacking. Computers process information in a manner that is analogous to the
human brain, which provides the courts enough support to make such a ruling.
II. BACKGROUND OF INSIDER TRADING LAW

A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
An understanding of insider trading law begins with The Security Exchange
Act of 1934 (Act). 24 This Act, a response to the 1929 stock market crash, seeks to
supervise and regulate securities trading. 25 Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the
relevant provisions of the Act, form the foundation of insider trading law.26
Indeed, the majority of inside traders are prosecuted under these two provisions.2
Section 10(b) provides that a person may not "use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device

or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." 28 Section 10(b) is implemented by Rule lOb-5, which makes it
''unlawful for any person . . . to employ any device . . . to defraud . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."29 Under Rule lOb-5, the
SEC can prosecute a defendant for fraud by showing the defendant made a
''material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities that has caused damages.",o The deception element is satisfied by the
24. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 1 (2007) (noting that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (along with the Security Act of 1933) "have become the principal governors of federal
securities law regulation").
25. J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 98-99 (2006) (noting that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was "intended to provide substantial governmental oversight to the securities
industry" and "seeks to regulate trading in the securities markets") (emphasis removed).
26. STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 223 ("Generally, the antifraud provisions of the securities acts were
designed to protect investors, to help ensure fair dealing in the securities markets, and to promote ethical
business practices.").
27. STRADER, supra note 25, at 108.
28. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
30.
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occurrence of a misrepresentation or an omission." However, an omission is only
deceptive when there is a duty to inform.32 In the context of computer hacking,
the device must be deceptive, not manipulative, due to the way "manipulative"
has been defined by the courts." The Supreme Court has ruled that
"Cmanipulative" implies defrauding shareholders by rigging the price of
securities.4 Hacking into a computer in no way amounts to rigging the price of
securities.
While Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are used to prosecute inside traders,
these provisions fail to lay out a definition of "insider trading." Instead, courts
have defined what it means to be an inside trader,3 and as discussed below, the
definition of an inside trader has expanded over time. 38
B. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading
Under the classical theory, only a person who is literally "inside the firm"including directors, officers, and employees-may be considered an insider."
This theory provides that an insider who acquires material information not
accessible to the public may not trade on that information, unless the person
makes the information public before trading.4 It is the fiduciary duty between
these insiders (agents) and the shareholders of the corporation (principals) that
forms the basis of the classical theory. 4 1 Since a duty exists between insiders and

CASE STUDIES 911 (2008).

31. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d. Cir. 2009) ("Chiarella, O'Hagan,and Zandford all stand for
the proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty 'satisfies § 10(b)'s requirement . . . [of| a
'deceptive device or contrivance[.]'").
32. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
misleading under Rule lOb-5.").
33. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that hacking, at least
in this case, does not amount to "manipulation").
34. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) ("[Manipulative] connotes intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities."); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) ("[Manipulation] refers generally to
practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity.").
35. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 46 n.3 (2d. Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court concluded that hacking is
not manipulative and that the parties did not challenge that conclusion).
36. STRADER, supra note 25, at 108.
37. Id.
38. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (limiting insider trading to insiders);
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that outsiders may be liable for inside trading).
39. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supranote 30, at 957.
40. Id. at 956 ('The classical theory of insider trading is concerned with corporate insiders' unfair use of
corporate information to make a profit at the expense of outsiders who couldn't possibly . . . discover the
information."); see also Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 578 (2008) (providing that
insider trading involves the trading of "material, nonpublic information").
41. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 957; Steinbuch, supra note 40, at 578.
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shareholders, failing to inform the shareholders of the nonpublic information
amounts to a material omission of fact. Thus, the insiders are deceiving the
shareholders.
In Chiarella v. United States, a majority of the Supreme Court formally
adopted the classical theory. 42 There, the defendant-a printer working for an
independent financial printing company that regularly printed financial
documents-printed documents announcing several corporate takeover bids.43
After using the documents to discern the identity of the target companies, the
defendant bought stock in those companies." After the takeovers, the defendant
sold the stock, realizing huge profits.45
The issue in Chiarella was whether the defendant, an outsider, was required
to publicize the information before trading.46 Using common law principals and
prior case law, the majority noted that a person with material information is only
required to disclose it when there was a duty to do so.47 Since the defendant was
not an insider of any of the target or acquiring companies, he had no duty to the
shareholders of those companies .48Thus, the defendant was not liable as an inside
trader.49
C.

The MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading

Two seminal misappropriation cases stand for the proposition that stealing
nonpublic information and trading on it amounts to fraud: one is Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Chiarellaand the other is United States v. O'Hagan.o In his
Chiarella dissent, Burger read the language of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as
referring to any person committing fraudulent behavior." Thus, the difference

42. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (holding that defendant was not an insider under the classical theory,
and was thus wrongly convicted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 227-28.
At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon the false
statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to
disclose arises when one party has information that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (bracket in the original).
48. See id. at 232 ("[T]he element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in
this case.").
49. See id. at 237 (providing that the court reversed the defendant's conviction).
50. GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 625; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, J., dissenting); United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
51. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("The language of § 10(b) and of Rule lOb-5 ...
reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme.").

934

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
between an insider and an outsider was a legal fiction." With a utilitarian
viewpoint, Burger reasoned that the policy behind limiting insider trading to
insiders should itself be limited."
The rationale behind allowing outsiders to profit from the information they
have lawfully gathered was to incentivize hard work.54 A knowledgeable trader
who performs "hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting," will benefit
from his conduct. 5 However, if someone could merely steal information acquired
through another's hard work, there would be no incentive to perform the hard
work in the first place." Thus, when an outsider acquires information in an
unlawful manner, Chief Justice Burger reasoned, the outsider should have a duty
to disclose." Congress does not want those who deceive and steal to have an
unfair advantage over those who refrain from engaging in such practices.
In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory, but
rather than embrace Burger's broad utilitarian approach, the Court laid out a
much more limited theory." There, the defendant worked for a law firm that
represented a client who made a tender offer for a target company.6 The
defendant, who did not take part in the representation, bought over two thousand
options and common stock in the target company after learning of the tender
offer." After the tender offer was publicly announced, the defendant sold the
options and common stock, making a profit of over $4.3 million.62
The Court held that one commits deception when he takes information from
a supplier and, feigning loyalty, uses that information for his own benefit. 63 The
Court embraced the policy behind the misappropriation theory.6 Investors will
only trade in the market if they are sure that there will be laws to prevent the
52. See id. ("[The use of the word 'any'] negates the suggestion that congressional concern was limited
to trading by 'corporate insiders' or to deceptive practices related to 'corporate information."').
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. (arguing that the rule allowing outsiders to profit from their hard work should not apply
"when an informational advantage is obtained ... by some unlawful means").
57. Id. ("I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading.").
58. Id. at 241 ("The antifraud provisions were designed in large measure to assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preference or advantages among investors." (internal quotations omitted)).
59. GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 625 ("Chief Justice Burger's utilitarian theory was not the theory adopted
by the court in O'Hagan. Instead the court adopted what might be labeled the 'sneaky theft' theory.").
60. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
61. Id. at 647-48.
62. Id. at 648.
63. Id. at 653-54 ("A fiduciary who '[pretends]' loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the
principal's information for personal gain, dupes or defrauds the principal.").
64. See id. at 658 ("Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors
likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law.").
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misappropriation of material, nonpublic information. Since O'Hagan, a person
"violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information.""
O'Hagan also made an important ruling concerning the relationship between
the "in connection with" element and the deception element of Rule l0b-5.67
There are two possible interpretations of the rule. One interpretation is that the
"in connection with" element requires the deception to simultaneously occur with
the purchase or sale of a security. 8 This happens if the trader lies to the
purchaser,inducing the purchaser to buy the security. The second interpretation,
found in O'Hagan,takes a much more liberal view of the rule. 69 Suppose a trader
tells an information supplier that the inside information will not be traded on, but
then later trades on the information. In reality, the deception takes place the
moment the trader lies to the information supplier.70 However, the Court ruled
that the deception does not occur until the inside information is actually traded
on; if there was no trading, the trader did not actually lie in his statement to the
.71
information supplier.
Had the Court in O'Hagan adopted the first interpretation, the issue of
whether a computer can be deceived would be moot. The hacker first hacks into
the computer, and subsequently, rather than simultaneously, trades on the

65. Id.
66. Id. at 652.
67. Id. at 656 (noting that the "in connection with" element is completed when the inside information is
traded on, not when it is received from the information source).
68. Under Justice Burger's utilitarian approach, which was not adopted by O'Hagan,the duty to disclose
information runs to the other party of the transaction. GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 625-26. Thus, the other party
is deceived when the misappropriator does not disclose the information. Id. As a result, the deception would
occur simultaneously with the purchase and sale of the security. See id. (noting that Burger's approach would
have "avoided the 'in connection with' issue"). In his dissent in O'Hagan,Justice Thomas highlighted that the
defendant could have done anything with the confidential information, including selling it to a newspaper.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, the majorities reasoning on the "in connection
element" was problematic. Id. at 686.
69. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (finding that the trader satisfies the deception element by lying to the
information supplier).
70. See GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 626-27 (explaining that if a spy lies to a guard of a vault to gain
secret documents, the guard has clearly been defrauded regardless of what the spy does with the documents).
71. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
[The "in connection with"] element is satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal,
he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of
duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the
trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information .. . A misappropriator who trades on
the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position
through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of
the investing public."
Id.; see also GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 627 ("[Ulnless [the misappropriator] trades, the fiduciary has not misled
anyone about his or her intentions.").
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information taken from the computer. Even if the computer had the ability to be
deceived, the deception took place prior to the trading, and thus was not in
connection with it.
IH. HACKING AS A "DECEPTIVE DEVICE"

When facing the issue of whether hacking satisfies the deception element,
courts seem to focus on the fiduciary duty aspect rather than on whether a
computer can be deceived.72 However, regardless of whether a duty is required,
one cannot meet the deception element unless a computer can be deceived."
Since the SEC prosecutes hackers as inside traders, it is important to evaluate the
Commission's reasoning concerning how the deception element can be met. The
SEC believes that a computer can be deceived. 4 "By its very nature," the SEC
urges, "computer hacking involves deceptive .

.

. conduct."7

Before immersing

ourselves into the SEC's reasoning for such an assertion, a brief introduction of
computer hacking is necessary for a complete understanding of the issue.
A. Different Hacking Techniques
Generally, two kinds of computer crimes exist: "traditional crimes committed
using computers, and crimes of computer misuse.", 6 Traditional computer crimes
involve ordinary crimes committed using the Internet as a means. Examples
include Internet gambling, disseminating child pornography over the Internet,
and cyberstalking." Computer misuse, on the other hand, is "conduct that
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes interference with the
proper functioning of computers and computer networks." 9 Hacking is an
example of computer misuse.0

72. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d. Cir. 2009) (holding that a fiduciary duty is not
necessary when an insider trading case involves hacking); Regents of the University of California v. Credit
Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a fiduciary duty is necessary when an insider
trading case involves hacking).
73. See Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 50-51. It can be inferred from the fact that the SEC argued that a
computer is inherently deceived by computer hacking, that a finding that a computer can be deceived is required
to find Dorozhko liable for insider trading in this case. Id.
74. Posthearing Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff at 12, SEC v. Dorozhko (S.D.N.Y 2007) (No.
107CV09606) [hereinafter Posthearing Memorandum] ("Dorozhko's theft of information by deceiving
Thomson Financial's computer system satisfies ... the use of a deceptive device.").
75. Id. at 8.
76. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrimes'sScope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1602 (2003).
77. Id. at 1602-03.
78. Id. at 1602.
79. Id. at 1603.
80. Id.
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There are a number of ways to hack into a computer."' One way is to "trick" a
computer by using someone else's code, leading the computer to give access to
the unauthorized user.8 2 Suppose, for example, that H, aware of V's username and
password, accesses V's account information." V is authorized to view the
information, but H is not. The computer is "tricked" in this situation. There are
a number of ways to gain access to an authorized user's password." A hacker can
simply try every possible combination, for instance, or guess passwords which
are specifically tailored to the authorized user. 6
Another way to hack into a computer is to exploit a weakness in a
computer's program and cause a malfunction, which gives the hacker greater
access to the information stored in the computer." An example of such a tactic is
a buffer overflow attack." A buffer overflow attack occurs when a hacker uses a
program to place more information into a buffer (the space within the computer's
memory used to store information) than there is remaining memory able to store
the information. 9 The computer will accept information, but will overwrite data
that is required to control the program.9 As a result, the hacker gains control of
the program.
B. The SEC's Argument That a Computer Can Be Deceived
In Dorozhko, the SEC made a number of arguments to support its assertion
that computer hacking satisfied the deception element of Section 10(b).9 2 It
simply analogized fraud in the context of insider trading with fraud in the context
81. Id. at 1644-45 (explaining two different types of computer misuse).
82. Id. at 1644 ("[Tjhe user may engage in false identification and masquerade as another user who has
greater privileges.").
83. Id. at 1645.
84. Id.
85. WINN SCHWARTAU, CYBERSHOCK: SURVIVING HACKERS, PHREAKERS, IDENTITY THIEVES,
INTERNET TERRORISTS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DISRUPTION 166 (2000) (describing different password
hacking techniques).
86. Id.
87. Kerr, supra note 76, at 1645.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also Maciej Ogorkiewicz & Piotr Frej, Analysis of Buffer Overflow Attacks, WINDOWS
SECURITY.COM, http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Analysis-ofBufferOverflowAttacks.html
(last
visited Apr. 2, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[B]uffer overflow occurs anytime the program
writes more information into the buffer than the space it has allocated in the memory."); STEVEN DEFINO ET
AL., OFFICIAL CERTIFIED ETHICAL HACKER REVIEW GUIDE 162 (2010) ("A buffer overflow occurs when input
given to an application exceeds the amount of memory that was set aside to store it.").
90. DEFINO ET AL., supra note 89, at 162 ("The input is still accepted, and it overwrites other critical
data such as register counters that the CPU (Central Processing Unit) requires to manage the running of the
program.").
91. Kerr, supra note 76, at 1645; Ogorkiewicz & Frej, supra note 89.
92. See Posthearing Memorandum, supra note 74, at 8-11 (explaining how computer hacking is
deceptive or manipulative).
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of other federal laws, and argued that the similarities were close enough. 3
Specifically, the SEC pointed to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, federal mail
and wire fraud statutes, and the Model Penal Code. 94
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a defendant who gains access to a
protected computer without authorization and subsequently uses the unauthorized
access to commit a fraud is culpable if the defendant acquires "anything of
value."95 Under federal mail and wire fraud statutes, the government must show:
(1) the defendant executed a "scheme to defraud"; (2) the defendant made
material misstatements or omissions; (3) the defendant intended to defraud; (4)
the scheme results in a loss of property; (5) the United States mail, interstate or
international wires, or private courier, were used in furtherance of the scheme to
defraud; and (6) the defendant used the mail or wires.9
The SEC also contended that Model Penal Code section 223.3, relating to
theft by deception, supports the assertion that hacking constitutes deception.97
Subsection 223.3(1) provides that a defendant is guilty of theft by deception if he
"creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law,
value, intention or other state of mind."98 Subsection (2) provides that a defendant
is guilty if he "prevents another from acquiring information which would affect
his judgment of a transaction."" Finally, subsection (3) provides that the
defendant is guilty if he "fails to correct a false impression which the [defendant]
. . . knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or
confidential relationship."'"
C. Why the SEC's Argument Is Problematic
An in-depth analysis shows that the authors of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, federal mail and wire fraud statutes, and the Model Penal Code did
not contemplate that a computer would be the victim of deception. Rather, the
statutes seem to apply solely to humans. Breaking down each statute is
illustrative.
A look at how courts have interpreted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
shows that the SEC's analogy is mistaken. In Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2008). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act provides that anyone who
"knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds
authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value,
unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of
such use is not more than $5,000 in any I-year period." Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2008).
97. Posthearing Memorandum, supra note 74, at 12.
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1) (1980).
99. Id. §223.3(2).
100. Id. §223.3(3).
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Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., the court held "to defraud," in the context of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, simply means to "wrong[] one in his property
rights by dishonest methods or schemes."'o' The court adopted this broad
definition of fraud rather than the common law definition.1o2
The court's ruling is informative for two reasons. First, looking at the
language, the definition is not referring to a computer. The words "one" and
"his" support this assertion. Second, the origin of this definition also illustrates
that the statute is not referring to computers. The Shurgard court adopted this
definition from Hammerschmidt v. United States.'o There, the Supreme Court
created this definition in a case which involved deception of the U.S.
government.'" Thus, the concept of deceiving a computer did not exist anywhere
in the concept of this definition.
Similarly, mail and wire fraud statutes do not provide a convincing analogy.
The typical mail and wire fraud case occurs when the defendant uses the mail or
a wire as a means to deceive a person on the other end of the communication.'o
For example, in Lustiger v. United States, the defendant mailed advertisements to
potential buyers containing misrepresentations.'" The defendant was using the
mail as means for deceiving the potential buyers.'07 Conversely, in Dorozhko,
Dorozhko did not use the Internet as a means to deceive a person.'o If he had
done so, the mail and wire fraud statutes would be analogous. However,
Dorozhko used the Internet to gain access to the information on Thomson
Financial's website.'" Dorozhko never made contact with a human being." 0
The fact that some courts require that the victim reasonably rely on the
deception supports the inference that mail and wire fraud statutes apply solely to
humans."' This reliance element indicates that there must be a victim-a
human-who is deceived. Arguing that hacking involves fraud in the same
manner as mail and wire fraud is similar to claiming that the mail (such as a
parcel) or wire (such as physical phone line) is literallybeing deceived.

101. Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125 (W.D.
Wash. 2000).
102. Id. at 1125-26.
103. See id. at 1125 (taking the definition of "to defraud" from Hammerschmidt).
104. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
105. See, e.g., Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 134-35 (9th Cir. 1967) (deciding a mail fraud
case).
106. Id. at 134-35.
107. Id. at 135.
108. See generally SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d. Cir. 2009) (mentioning no facts that Dorozhko
even communicated with a person).
109. Id. at 44 (noting that Dorozhko hacked into Thomson Financial's server).
110. See generally id. at 44-45 (mentioning no facts that Dorozhko communicated with a human).
Ill. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1557 (1Ith Cir. 1996) (describing the circuit court
split and citing cases).
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Instead, mail and wire fraud is more akin to phishing."' A typical phishing
scheme begins when a computer user receives an email from a phisher that seems
to be "from a reputable company.""' After clicking the link, the user is taken to
another webpage or a pop-up page, also purporting to be reputable. 4 This new
window asks the user for personal information."' If provided, the phisher uses
this information to make purchases, apply for credit cards, or simply steal the
user's identity." 6 The user believed he or she was dealing with the reputable
company, when in reality, the user was not."' The phisher deceived the user, not
the computer. Thus, the SEC's attempted analogy proves inadequate.
Concerning the SEC's alleged support from the Model Penal Code, a careful
reading shows that the Code does not contemplate computer hacking. Looking at
section 223.3(1), for example, the text explicitly uses the term "other state of
mind.""' This suggests that the one being deceived must have a state of mind.
Similarly, subsection (2) requires a detrimental effect on the victim's "judgment
of a transaction."" 9 It can be reasonably inferred that the Model Penal Code
assumes that the one being deceived is human, unless the code assumes
computers can make judgments. For subsection (3) to be applicable, a person
must be able to have a "fiduciary or confidential relationship" with a computer.120
Fiduciary and confidential relationships only exist between humans.12' Thus, the
Model Penal Code presumes a human is being deceived, not a computer. The
SEC's flawed arguments highlight the need for the courts to make a
determination of whether computers can be deceived.
IV. CAN A COMPUTER BE DECEIVED?

To violate Section 10(b), a computer hacker must engage in deception.' 22 It is
crucial for the courts to determine whether a hacker can deceive a computer. If
the courts rule that a computer cannot be deceived, then a hacker does not engage
in deception simply by hacking into a computer. Since the hacker has not
engaged in deception, the hacker cannot be tried as an inside trader.'2 But the
112. What is Phishing, WINDowsLIVE.COM, http://onecare.live.com/site/en-Us/article/phishing-what.
htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1) (1980).
119. Id. § 223.3(2).
120. Id. § 223.3(3).
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "relationship" as "[t]he nature of the
association between two or more people") (emphasis added).
122. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008) (requiring deception for anyone to violate).
123. Id.
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first step is to determine whether a computer can be deceived. In the first
instance, it may seem that hacking into a computer is clearly deceptive. However,
analogizing a computer to a simple mechanism, such as a door lock,
demonstrates the weakness of that assertion.
A.

Door-Lock Hypothetical

Assuming that a computer's security system is merely a sophisticated door
lock highlights the issue that many courts and commentators have overlooked.124
The hypothetical is as follows: accessing the information stored on a computer is
analogous to accessing a room behind a closed door.125 A computer which is
password-protected can only be accessed by one who has the correct username
and password.126 Similarly, a door may be locked, making the room behind the
door only accessible by key. 2 7 Hacking into a computer-in the sense that an
unauthorized hacker uses the username and password of an authorized person-is
similar to gaining access to a room by using a key without the owner's
permission. Both cases would involve mere theft and unlawful access, and the
user would only be liable for those offenses. Alternatively, hacking into a
computer by such means as a buffer overflow attack would be more akin to
picking a lock. The hacker gains access to the information in the computer, but
uses an alternative method. Similarly, a door lock is picked when the lock's
inner-workings are manipulated in a manner that results in the door becoming
unlocked as if a key was used.128
No one would argue that a lock is deceived when an unauthorized person
uses the key of an authorized person, or when a lock-pick is used. A door lock
does not "think" an authorized person is using a key to unlock the door. Equally,
a door lock does not "think" someone is using a key, when in fact someone is
using a lock-pick. Burglary, for example, which can involve breaking into a lock,

124. GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 627.
[Tihe hacker may enter false information designed to have the security system think that the hacker
is entitled to access, so this seems like fraud . . . . [I]f a burglar attempts to pick a lock, is this fraud
because the burglar is trying to make the lock think that the pick is a key? Is a computer security
system not simply a more elaborate lock and are not passwords and software conmmands simply
more elaborate keys? Or are they something more?
Id.
125. See Kerr, supra note 76, at 1619-21 (discussing what it means to access).
126. Id. at 1620.
127. Id.
128. Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How Lock Picking Works, HowSTuFFWORKS.coM, http://home.
howstuffworks.com/home-improvement/household-safety/securityllock-picking.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("In a normal deadbolt lock, a movable bolt or latch is embedded in
the door so it can be extended out the side. This bolt is lined up with a notch in the frame. When you turn the
lock, the bolt extends into the notch in the frame, so the door can't move. When you retract the bolt, the door
moves freely.").
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does not frame the entry element as deceiving a lock.' In this line of reasoning, a
computer would not be deceived when a user employs a username and password
without authorization, or uses a buffer overflow attack to gain the information
inside a computer.
Thus, if the courts find that a computer cannot think, in the same way as a
door lock cannot think, then a hacker will not be liable as an inside trader.
Breaking into a computer and stealing information would then be mere theft.
While some commentators argue that "mere thieves" should be liable for insider
trading, 3 0 courts have generally been firm in holding the contrary. 3 ' The only
way hackers could be prosecuted is if courts refrain from using an analogy
similar to the lock-pick, and find that computers have the capacity to think. This
way, the computers would be deceived-when a hacker uses either a username
and password without authorization, a buffer over flow attack, or an alternative
hacking method-and all the elements of Section 10(b) would be met. This raises
the dispositive question: Do computers have the capacity to think?
B. Thinking Is Beyond a Computer's Capacity
As the following discussion will show, theorists, scientists, and philosophers
have long debated whether a computer can think.132 This Comment certainly will
not provide a definitive answer to that question. However, if experts could show
that computers think in a way similar enough to that of a human, then courts will
have adequate support to rule that hackers can deceive computers for Section
10(b) purposes.
Some theorists argue that computers cannot think because thinking requires
something more than just computation.'13 A number of assertions have been
offered, allegedly identifying what exactly it is that will never allow computers to
have the capacity to think.' 4 The idea of "consciousness" requires something that
is manifested in an immaterial capacity, and computers are made-up only of
129. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (providing no deception element).
130. See, e.g., Steinbuch, supra note 40, at 578 (laying out a theory that those who acquire material
nonpublic information and trade upon it are culpable under current insider trading principles).
131. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("(No federal court has ever held
that those who steal material nonpublic information and then trade on it violate § 10(b).").
132. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds, in SCIENCE FICTION AND
PHILOSOPHY: FROM TIME TRAVEL TO SUPERINTELLIGENCE 186, 186-91 (Susan Schneider ed., 2009)
(presenting arguments that computers cannot think); Ned Block, The Mind as the Software of the Brain, in
SCIENCE FICTION AND PHILOSOPHY: FROM TIME TRAVEL TO SUPERINTELLIGENCE 126, 164 (Susan Schneider
ed., 2009) (presenting arguments that computers can think).
133. Mitchell Waldrop, Can Computers Think?, in THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 63 (Raymond
Kurzweil ed., 1990) (."[T]hinking is something going on in the brain all right, but it is not computation at all,
thinking is something holistic and emergent-and organic and fuzzy and warm and cuddly and mysterious."')
(quoting Daniel C. Dennett, philosopher).
134.

Dennett, supra note 132, at 186-91. These theorists view "thinking" as the ability to have

consciousness. Id.
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material parts. 3 1 Consciousness requires an organic brain, whereas computers are
inorganic by definition.' Only naturally born entities can exhibit consciousness,
which computers are not.'3 ' Further, consciousness requires complexity, which
computers cannot attain."' The view that computers have the inability to think is
also demonstrated by the difference in intelligence between a computer and a
human brain.'3 1
1. Difference in Intelligence
"Intelligence" is defined by breaking it down into its individual components:
"learning, reasoning, and the ability to manipulate symbols."' "Learning" is
defined as the acquiring of facts, the understanding of the relationship between
those facts, and the implication of those facts. 4 ' A computer's ability to learn is
different than a human's ability to learn.142 While computers have the ability to
remember billions of facts, computers lack the ability to understand the
relationship between those facts.' 3 Conversely, humans cannot remember
considerable amounts of facts with the same accuracy that computers
demonstrate.'" Humans, however, do have the ability to comprehend the
relationships between those facts. 14 For instance, humans are able to understand
the fine relationship between characters in a novel-an ability computers lack.'46
"Reasoning" is defined as "the ability to draw deductions and inferences
from knowledge with the purpose of achieving a goal or solving a problem."' 47
Compared to computers, humans have a superior ability to make inferences and
deductions from incomplete knowledge.' From there, humans make decisions. 49
Generally, a computer uses "hard rules," which means that a computer has a
predetermined conclusion to a specific antecedent.'so

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.

138.

Id. at 190.

139. IAN GLYNN, AN ANATOMY OF THOUGHT: THE ORIGIN AND MACHINERY OF THE MIND 246 (1999).
140. Raymond Kurzweil, What is Intelligence, Anyway?, in THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 16
(Raymond Kurzweil ed., 1990).
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id.
143. Id.; GLYNN, supra note 139, at 246 (stating that computers are better at "long or complex
arithmetical problems" than the human brain is).
144. Kurzweil, supra note 140, at 17.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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The capacity to manipulate symbols also differentiates humans from
computers."' Rather than being listed, symbols 5 2 are usually arranged in complex
patterns. 53 Humans can understand patterns made up of symbols they are aware
of, even if they learned the symbol in a different context.15 4 In contrast, computers
have difficulty performing such tasks.' 5
2.

The Chinese Room

John Searle's famous "Chinese Room" hypothetical demonstrates the view
that computers have the inability to think.' 6 The hypothetical begins with a
person (David), an English speaker with no understanding of Chinese, secluded
in a room.' By sliding slips of paper under the door, the experimenter gives
David a story and a number of questions pertaining to the story; both the story
and the questions written in Chinese. 5 ' David also receives a description, written
in English, supplying "an algorithmic way of answering the question as a native
[Chinese] speaker might."' David uses the description to form new answers to
the questions and then passes those answers on.'6 Looking at David's answers,
one might think that he understands Chinese. 6 ' But in reality, David does not
understand a word of Chinese. 62
Similarly, Searle argues, a computer does not understand, even if it can
answer questions.1' A computer simply "uses formal rules to manipulate abstract
symbols."'" And like David, who responded to questions in Chinese without
understanding the language, the computer does not understand.'65 However, if the
language was English instead of Chinese, and David was an English speaker,

151. Id.
152. Id. ("A symbol is a name or sign that stands for something else, generally a structure or network of
facts and other symbols.").
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. GLYNN, supra note 139, at 246 ("[Computers] are very much worse at ... recognizing visual or
verbal patterns, or recognizing shape from shading, or deriving three-dimensional structures from two
dimensional images."). However, advanced artificial intelligence programs are gaining this complex ability.
THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES, supra note 140, at 17.
156. Waldrop, supra note 133, at 64.
157. STAN FRANKLIN, ARTIFICIAL MINDS 105 (1995).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 105-06.
162. Id. at 106.
163. Id.
164. Waldrop, supra note 133, at 64.
165. Id.
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then the hypothetical would be analogous to what a human does.'6 The words
suddenly have meaning, and David understands what is being said.16
Commentators have offered several counterarguments to Searle's Chinese
Room hypothetical.'" One argument claims the hypothetical is misleading.'69
Shuffling through the sheer number of slips of paper, which could number in the
billions, to devise one answer could take years.7 o Searle responds by noting that
David could just memorize all the information on the slips of paper."' But if that
were the case, David would understand Chinese.172
Another counterargument is that, while David alone may not understand
Chinese, the whole system (the room, the process of slipping questions and
answers back and forth, the algorithmic way to answer questions, and David)
understands the language.' Similarly, a computer's central processing unit itself
does not think, but is instead a component of a thinking system.174
Computers may not have that extra something that provides the same level of
consciousness as humans, or consciousness at all. Clearly, a computer's
intelligence is different from a human's intelligence. Searle's Chinese room
hypothetical, however flawed, is informative. Relying on theories such as the
Chinese Room, it seems a computer is akin to a door lock, unable to think.
C.

Computers Can Think
1. The Turing Test

Other theorists suggest that computers do have the capacity to think. One of
those theorists was the mathematician, Alan Turing, whose Turing Test was
purported to determine whether something has the ability to think.'75 The concept
behind the test is rather simple. Suppose there are two people and one
computer.'"6 The humans, A and B, and the computer, C, are all in separate
rooms.7 7 A, the judge in the exercise, asks B and C the same questions, and B

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 64-66 (examining some of those counterarguments).
169. Id. at 65.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Block, supra note 132, at 164.
175. Id. at 127.
176. Benjamin Soskis, Man and the Machines: It's Time to Start Thinking About How We Might Grant
Legal Rights to Computers, LEGAL AFFAIRs (Jan.IFeb. 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.orglissues/JanuaryFebruary-2005/feature.sokisjanfeb05.msp (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
177. Id. (explaining that a man and a computer are physically separated from an interrogator).
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and C provide responses to these questions. If A cannot distinguish between B
and C, then C, the computer, is intelligent and has the ability to think.79
ELIZA was a program created to pass the Turing Test, and, in one of its
versions, was designed to emulate a psychiatrist.'so The following provides a
description of how ELIZA mimics a person:
[ELIZA] employs a group of simple but effective strategies. For
example, it looks for "key words" on a list supplied by the programmer,
e.g., "I", "you", "alike", "father", and "everybody". The words are
ordered; for example, "father" comes before "everybody", so if you type
in "My father is afraid of everybody", the machine will spit back one of
its "father" responses, such as "WHAT ELSE COMES TO MIND
WHEN YOU THINK OF YOUR FATHER?" If you type in "Everybody
laughed at me", you will get one of its responses to "everybody", such as
"WHO IN PARTICULAR ARE YOU THINKING OF?" It also has
techniques that simultaneously transform "you" into "I", and "me" into
"you" so that if you type in "You don't agree with me", it can reply:
"WHY DO YOU THINK THAT I DON'T AGREE WITH YOU?"
One program that passed the Turing Test was PARRY.'82 PARRY used
prearranged responses like ELIZA, and was programmed to answer as if it were a
paranoid patient.'83 When given PARRY's responses, psychiatrists were unable to
distinguish PARRY from real human patients.'8
However, critics say the Turing Test is flawed, because whether a computer
passes the test depends on the judge's knowledge of computers.'" On the one
hand, if the judge is exceedingly knowledgeable of intelligent computers, it will
be more difficult for a computer program to pass the Turing Test.'86 On the other
hand, if the judge has no knowledge of computers whatsoever, a computer
program will have a much better chance to pass the test.'8 Whether the Turing

178. Id.
179. DANIEL CREVIER, Al: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF THE SEARCH FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
24(1993).
180. Block, supra note 132, at 128.
181. Id. at 128-29.
182. See CREVIER, supra note 179, at 137 (noting that psychiatrists were unable to distinguish PARRY
from human patients). It is important to note that it is debatable as to whether what PARRY was able to
accomplish actually amounts to passing the Turing Test. See FRANKLIN, supra note 157, at 101 (arguing that
"[t]o date, no machine has even come close to passing Turing's test in its full glory").
183. CREVIER, supra note 179, at 137.
184. Id.
185. Block, supranote 132, at 127-28.
186. Id. ("A judge who was a leading authority on genuinely intelligent machines might know how to
tell them apart from people.").
187. See id. at 128 ("A stupid judge, or one who has had no contact with technology, might think that a
radio was intelligent.").
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Test actually measures a computer's ability to think is questionable. Therefore,
the Turing Test does not seem to provide courts with evidence necessary to
conclude that computers can think for insider trading purposes.
2. Computing is Thinking
The support the courts need arises from the fact that a computer is analogous
to a human brain in that they both process information." The practicality of the
analogy depends on how in-depth one takes it. An in-depth analysis of how a
computer functions compared to how a brain functions reveals how different both
systems truly are.'"9 However, a simple analogy of the two systems offers courts
the needed support to give computers legal consciousness. If computers can
think, they can be deceived for insider trading purposes.
a. DetailedProcessingAnalogy
A computer consists of (1) a central processing unit, which, simply put,
controls what goes on in the computer; (2) a collection of pigeon holes, each
containing an address and capable of holding a number; (3) computer programs
that direct the central processor to do specific acts at specific times; and (4) a
screen, which displays what the central processing unit instructs it to do.'" This
design, common in the majority of computers, operates one step at a time.' 9 ' This
type of processing is called serial processing.192
The human brain, however, performs parallel processing. 93 This means that
the human brain does not process in a linear manner or take single steps
sequentially.'" While the term "hardware" is fitting for the computer, because the
properties of the computer are static, there is no corresponding concept when it
comes to the human brain.'95 The synapses of the human brain may change their
properties, and the complex circuitry of the human brain may change as well.'9
The term "software," which dictates the actions of the central processing unit,
also does not have an equivalent in the human brain.'"'

188. See GLYNN, supra note 139, at 245-46 (describing how both human brains and computers process
information).
189. Id. (highlighting the differences between the processing of a computer and that of a human brain).
190. Id. at 245.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 246.
194. Id. at 245.
195. Id. at 246.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Another difference between the human brain and a computer is processing
speed.'98 While the precise processing speed of the human brain is unknown, it
can process roughly 10 quadrillion calculations per second.'" The fastest
computer in the world as of this writing, China's Tianhe-lA, can process 2.57
quadrillion calculations per second. 200 Thus, even supercomputers have a ways to
go before their processing speed equals that of the human brain. 20' Additionally,
the average personal computer is dwarfed in comparison to the human brain.202 A
high-end home computer can only perform 111 billion calculations per second. 203
b. Simple ProcessingAnalogy
A comprehensive comparison between a human brain and a computer, which
focuses on the distinctions between the two, is clearly problematic. However,
courts can adopt a simpler analogy which focuses on the fact that both computers
and the human brain process information. 204 How each processes information,
whether serial or parallel, and the processing power of each is immaterial.
Theorists known as computationalists suggest a line of inferences to support
their argument that computers have the ability to think.205 They argue that
processing information is synonymous with thinking. 206 "[I]nformation
processing is computation, which is the manipulation of symbols . . . .,20'
"[S]ymbols, because of their relationships and linkages, mean something about
the external world." 208 Therefore, contend computationalists, computers have

198. See What Is the World's Fastest Computer?, HowSTUFFWORKS.coM, http://www.howstuffworks.
com/question54.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) [hereinafter FastestComputer] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating approximate processing speed of the human brain); China's Tianhe-1A Crowned
Supercomputer King, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-l1766840 (last visited Apr. 10,
2011) [hereinafter Tianhe-1A] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating processing speed of the
world's fastest computer).
199. Fastest Computer, supranote 198.
200. Tianhe-IA, supra note 198.
201. Compare Fastest Computer, supra note 198 (stating approximate processing speed of the human
brain); with Tianhe- IA, supra note 199 (stating processing speed of world's fastest computer).
202. Tom's HARDWARE, Benchmark Results: SiSoftware Sandra 2011, http://www.tomshardware.com/
reviews/core-i7-990x-extreme-edition-gulftown,2874-6.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (showing that an Intel Core i7-990x processor can perform at speeds up to 111
GFLOPS).
203. Id.
204. See GLYNN, supra note 139, at 245-47 (discussing how the human brain and computers process
information).
205. Waldrop, supra note 133, at 63 (noting Allen Newell and Herbert Simon as proponents of this
doctrine).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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artificial intelligence 2 OIn other words, computers have the capacity to think, and
thus can be deceived.
This simple line of inferences provides the courts with the support needed for
a ruling that computers have the capacity to think for insider trading purposes. In
other words, that computers have legal consciousness. Because computers have
this capacity to think, in that they can process information, computers are
distinguished from a door lock. When a person inserts a key or a lock-pick into a
door lock, the lock does not process any information. However, when a person
inputs information into a computer, the computer processes that information.2 o
This is akin to a human brain."'
V. SATISFYING THE DECEPTIVE DEVICE ELEMENT

When an inside trader conveys information to the human information source,
212
the human receives and processes that information.
The inside trader can
deceive the human by making the human think one reality when another reality is
true. The human falsely believes the insider will not trade on the information.
The deception is complete when the insider actually trades on the information, as
2 13
it was in O'Hagan.
When a hacker conveys information to a computer information-source, the
computer likewise receives and processes the information.2 14 The hacker can
deceive the computer by making the computer think that an authorized user is
gaining access to the information, when in fact the hacker is an unauthorized
user, or by using an alternative hacking method, such as a buffer overflow attack.
A human brain processes information, and thus thinks. A door lock does not
process information, and thus does not think. Since a computer processes
information, it thinks. Therefore, Section 10(b) will be satisfied because
computer hacking will involve a deceptive device: deceiving the computer. This
in itself gives courts enough ammunition to rule that computer hackers, who
deceive computers to gain inside information, can be prosecuted under Section
10(b). Now, instead of having to analogize to other statutes, such as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,2 5 the SEC has a clear argument that computer
hacking amounts to deception.

209. CREVIER, supra note 179, at 9 (Artificial intelligence can be defined as the "science of making
machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men.").
210. See GLYNN, supra note 139, at 245 (explaining how a computer operates).
211. Id.
212. See id. (describing how the human brain processes information).
213. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
214. See Glynn, supra note 139, at 245.
215. Posthearing Memorandum, supra note 74, at 10.
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VI. INTRODUCING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: APPLYING
PERSONHOOD TO COMPUTERS

It is unquestioned that courts assume humans have the capacity to be
deceived. Thus, if courts give computers personhood, computers will likewise
have the capacity to be deceived. Giving personhood to computers, in the context
of hacking and trading, is not wholly implausible. Non-human entities have had
legal rights for centuries."' Although it may be a legal fiction,1 courts have been
open to bestow legal rights on non-human entities;"' one of the most well-known
and debated entities with legal rights is the corporation." 9
A. CorporatePersonhood
In 1947, Congress enacted 1 U.S.C. § 1, which provides, "In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the
word[] 'person' . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms,

partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals ....
To the dismay of some,22 ' corporations have gained rights previously only
223
221
conferred on individual humans.222 Corporations can own property, enter into
2242226
act as trustees,225 and pay taxes.226 Corporations even have
contracts,

216. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 46 (Roland Gray ed., The
Macmillan Co. 1972) ("Inanimate things may be regarded as the subject of legal rights, and, as such, entitled to
sue in the courts. Such perhaps, were some of the temples in pagan Rome, and such seem often to have been
church buildings and the relics of the saints in the early Middle Ages.").
217. See id. at 53 ("lElven if a corporation be a real thing, it is yet a fictitious person ....
218. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal Rights for Natural Objects, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 452 (1972) ("The world of the lawyer is peopled with inanimate right-holders: trusts,
corporations, joint ventures, municipalities, Subchapter R partnerships, and nation-states, to mention just a
few.").
219. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1239
(1992) ("The most familiar examples of legal persons that are not natural persons are business corporations and
government entities.").
220. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2008).
221. See generally Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court should not have extended Fourteenth Amendment protections to
corporations).
222. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (extending political speech rights to
corporations).
223. See Solum, supra note 219, at 1259 ("[Tlhe property of corporations is protected from taking
without just compensation.").
224. See generally Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (holding that the
Contracts Clause applies to corporations).
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 33(1) (2003) ("A corporation has capacity to take and hold
property in trust . . . .").

226. Corporations, IRS.GOv, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98240,00.html
visited Apr. 2, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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constitutional rights.227 Recently, the Supreme Court expanded corporations' First
Amendment rights by allowing corporations to engage in political speech. 2 8
Aside from giving corporations rights, courts have implicitly held that
corporations can be deceived as well.229 In fact, some insider trading cases
involve a defendant deceiving a corporation instead of an individual human. 230
For example, in O'Hagan, the defendant had to have engaged in deception to be
liable as an inside trader. 231' The Court held that the defendant deceived his law
firm, the source of the information, when the defendant traded on the confidential
12
information. Thus, the defendant did not deceive a human being, but instead
deceived his law firm. 233
Similarly, in Dorozhko, if Dorozhko had not hacked the information, but
instead had talked directly to a human representing IMS, he would have deceived
the information supplier, IMS.234 Once again, a defendant deceived a corporation,
not an individual human.
The doctrine of corporate personhood makes clear that the courts are willing
235
to give legal rights to non-humans. If courts are willing to view corporations as
"persons," it is no stretch for the courts to take the same view regarding
computers.
B. Extending Personhoodto Computers
As previously explained, a computer and human brain can both process
236
information. While one may view a corporation as a system with working
components, the system does not process information in the way a human brain
or a computer does. Thus, a computer is much more analogous to a human brain
227. See Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v. Blaine Township, 649 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417 (W. D. Pa.
2009) ("The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that corporations have the right to assert
the very sort of constitutional claims alleged . , . ."); see also Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143
(1962) (applying Fifth Amendment protections to a corporation); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ("[A
corporation] can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination.").
228. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) ("Political speech is 'indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual."' (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978))).
229. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997) ("[A] person who trades in securities for
personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information" is guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
230. See, e.g., id. (describing how O'Hagan deceived his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney).
231. Id. at 650-51, 653-54.
232. Id. at 648.
233. Id.
234. GRAY, supra note 216, at 51 ("The powers granted by the State are not the rights of the men whose
wills put them in motion, for it is not the interests of those individual men that are protected; but, by a dogmatic
fiction, their wills are attributed to the corporation, and it is the corporation that has the rights.").
235. Stone, supra note 218, at 452.
236. GLYNN, supra note 139, at 245.
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than a corporation is. In fact, scholars have explored the concept of providing
rights to entities besides corporations previously.237 For instance, Christopher
Stone, in his essay Should Trees Have Standing, argued that natural objects
should have rights.238 While his concern was the environment, Stone highlights a
movement, however slight, towards providing legal rights to physical non-human
objects.239 Further, the discussion of providing those rights to computers is
already underway.24
Opponents of personhood for computers offer a number of objections for
their position.241 The objections mirror those arguments that computers lack the
capacity to think.242 One argument is that only humans should be given
personhood, computers are not humans, and thus computers should not been
given personhood. 243 However, computers are much more analogous to the
human brain than corporations, in that both can process information. 2 4 Since
corporations have personhood, there is no reason computers should be denied
personhood merely because they are not human. Another argument is that
computers lack a "critical element of personhood.""' This element may be a soul,
consciousness, intentionality, feelings, interests, or free will.2 " But a corporation
does not have a conscious, intentionality, feelings, interest, or free will. Further,
legal reasoning should not depend on concepts that belong in the religious or
philosophical realm.247
It may be safe to say that computers one day will have personhood in the
form of a number of rights. 248 At the moment, however, and in the context of
insider trading, computer personhood is not absolutely necessary. Yet, giving
computers very limited personhood may provide an alternative means to
prosecute inside traders under Section 10(b). Courts need not provide any
specific rights to computers. Instead, courts should rule that computers have
237. Stone, supra note 218, at 456 (arguing that legal rights should be given to non-humans).
238. Id. ("I am quite seriously proposing that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other socalled 'natural objects' in the environment-indeed, to the natural environment as a whole.").
239. Id.; Soskis, supra note 176 ("At some point in the not-too-distant future, we might actually face a
sentient, intelligent machine who demands, or who many come to believe deserves, some form of legal
protection.").
240. Soskis, supra note 176 (presenting several arguments offered by others concerning legal rights for
computers and robots).
241. Solum, supra note 219, at 1258-79.
242. Dennett, supra note 132, at 186-91; Solum, supra note 219, at 1258-62.
243. Solum, supra note 219, at 1258-62.
244. GLYNN, supra note 139, at 245.
245. Solum, supra note 219, at 1262.
246. Id. at 1262-74.
247. Id. at 1262-63 ("Political and legal decisions ought to be made in accord with the requirement of
public reason. The requirement of public reasons is that political and legal decisions must be justified on
grounds that are public. Public reason cannot rely on particular comprehensive religious and philosophical
conceptions of the good.").
248. Soskis, supra note 176.
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personhood in the sense that, like corporations, they can be deceived. This is not
too fanciful of an idea in light of the fact that corporations do not have the same
rights as humans-the courts have given them only a small number. If Dorozhko
received the inside information from an agent of IMS, the courts would find that
IMS, the corporation, was deceived.2 49 In a similar vein, courts can hold that a
computer, given personhood like a corporation, is deceived if a hacker receives
information from it.
VII. CONCLUSION

Computer hacking as a means for traders to gain inside information raises a
novel issue for the courts.250 To prosecute hackers under Section 10(b), the
hackers must act in a way that involves deception. 251' Hacking into a computer
only involves deception if the computer has the capacity to think.
For many years, theorists have argued about just that: whether computers
have the capacity to think.252 One group of theorists, the computationalists,
provides an argument that supplies a foundation for holding that computers can
think, and thus can be deceived.2 ' Because computers process information,
computers have the capacity to think. 2 4 How information is processed, whether
serial or parallel, is of no consequence. The result is a positive one. If computers
have legal consciousness, inside traders who use computer hacking as an
instrument to gain inside information can be prosecuted under Section 10(b).
For added support, courts can go one step further and grant computers
personhood. This form of personhood will be very limited; computers will only
be persons in that they can be deceived like corporations. If courts adopt the
proposals set forth in this Comment, hackers like Dorozhko will not be able to
evade prosecution under Section 10(b) simply because they gained their
information through computer hacking.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
doctrine).
254.
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GRAY, supra note 216, at 51.
See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d. Cir. 2009) (raising this issue).
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008).
See supra Part. IV (presenting the arguments of theorists on both sides of the debate).
Waldrop, supra note 133, at 63 (noting Allen Newell and Herbert Simon as proponents of this
Id.

